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Abstract. Significant difference between response to real and hypothetical valuation ques-
tions is often referred to as hypothetical bias. Some economists have had success with using
‘‘cheap talk’’ (which entails reading a script that explicitly highlights the hypothetical bias
problem before participants make any decisions) as a means of generating unbiased re-
sponses in a referendum format. In this article, we test the robustness of cheap talk using a
voluntary contribution mechanism with a provision point over a wide range of possible
payment amounts. Our results confirm the existence of hypothetical bias, and suggest that
cheap talk may eliminate hypothetical bias, but only for respondents facing higher
payments.
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1. Introduction
There is strong empirical evidence suggesting that the contingent valuation
method (CVM) often overstates real economic value. For example, in a re-
view of the literature, Harrison and Rutstro¨m (forthcoming) found that 34 of
39 CVM estimates reviewed contained hypothetical bias with an average bias
of about 338%. These results are consistent with those in meta-analyses by
List and Gallet (2001), and Murphy et al. (2005).
This problem has motivated research to develop techniques that either
eliminate or adjust for hypothetical bias. Of particular interest is the ‘‘cheap
talk’’ CVM design recently employed by Cummings and Taylor (1999)
(hereafter C&T) wherein experimental subjects were read a script describing
the bias problem and were explicitly asked to not overstate their true
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willingness to pay (WTP). C&T were successful in using the cheap talk design
to eliminate hypothetical bias in a referendum for three different public
goods. However, the evidence about cheap talk’s robustness is mixed.
Cummings et al. (1995a, b) found that a shortened version of the script
actually worsens the bias, but a lengthier script similar to that in Cummings
and Taylor (1999) was successful. Similarly, Poe et al. (2002) tested a
shortened version of the cheap talk script in a voluntary contribution tele-
phone survey and found that the short script had no effect. Conversely,
Aadland and Caplan (2003) find that a short cheap talk script was effective.
List (2001) reports that a long script did not reduce hypothetical bias with
experienced card dealers, but was effective with inexperienced participants;
both Lusk (2003), and Aadland and Caplan (2003) report similar results.
Brown et al. (2003a, b) found that the long cheap talk script was successful in
a referendum, but only for higher payment amounts.
The simplicity of cheap talk makes it an attractive approach in minimizing
hypothetical bias; however, it is important to understand how it works under
different contexts.WhereasC&T, andBrownet al. (2003a, b) use a referendum,
this article tests the ability of cheap talk to elicit actual values for a public good
usingadichotomouschoice format inavoluntarycontributionmechanismwith
a provision point (PPM). Although frequently used in CVM studies, voluntary
contribution mechanisms are often thought to be neither incentive compatible
nor demand revealing (Berrens et al. 2002; Poe et al. 2002). Consequently, a
concern here is that voluntary contribution mechanisms may exacerbate
hypothetical bias because of free-riding associated with actual contributions.
Although the voluntary contribution mechanism is not incentive com-
patible, experimental evidence has consistently shown that pure free-riding
occurs far less than predicted by expected utility theory (see Ledyard 1995 for
a summary of the literature). To reduce any free-riding effects, we use a
modified voluntary contribution mechanism that incorporates a one-shot
provision point with a money-back guarantee if the provision point is not
met (Rondeau et al. 1999). Benefits are extended if the provision point is
exceeded. Issac et al. (1989), Rondeau et al. (1999), and Marks and Croson
(1998) show that the PPM significantly increases voluntary contributions.
Rondeau et al. (1999), and Rose et al. (2002) observe approximately demand
revealing behavior with a provision point mechanism and that it is generally
more efficient than a simple VCM, with a few minor exceptions.
Voluntary contribution mechanisms are important because they are
widely used and may often be the only plausible way of financing some types
of goods, such as local public goods (Berrens et al. 2002; Champ et al. 1997).
Moreover, theoretically incentive compatible mechanisms, such as a refer-
endum, are not without disadvantages. Even if a referendum were a credible
means of generating the revenue to provide the good, the NOAA panel
recognizes that the referendum itself is still hypothetical, and respondents
may not believe that the payment vehicle (e.g., taxes, higher prices, etc.) will
be implemented (Arrow et al. 1993). In addition, the NOAA panel notes that
respondents may not expect their votes to influence the outcome. Moreover,
respondents may object to mandatory payments, possibly for selfish reasons
or because they do not wish to impose a cost on those who would not
otherwise contribute voluntarily (Champ et al. 1997). Clearly, the researcher
has no taxing authority, so compulsory payments, if the referendum were to
pass, are not only problematic for field studies, but can also generate ill-will
in laboratory settings with students who may be involuntarily forced to
relinquish money earned for participating. Perhaps most importantly, despite
the theoretical advantages of the referendum format in eliminating free-rid-
ing, empirical evidence suggests that hypothetical bias persists (Cummings
et al. 1995a, b, 1997; Taylor 1998; Brown et al. 2003), and the complexities
involved in applying corrective mechanisms in the field are often over-
whelming (Rondeau et al. 1999).
An issue particularly relevant to this paper is that cheap talk may only
work well for higher payment levels. C&T used only one payment level ($10),
whereas Brown et al. (2003a, b) varied payment amounts between $1 and $8.
They found that for referenda, cheap talk eliminated hypothetical bias
associated with $5 and $8 payments, but cheap talk had very little effect on
lower levels. However, their payment range ($1–$8) is rather narrow and if
cheap talk is to be used in a dichotomous choice framework, it is important
to determine its impact over a much wider range of values and in a voluntary
contribution setting.
Consequently, in this article we test the robustness of the C&T cheap talk
procedure for eliminating hypothetical bias associated with provision of a
local public good in a voluntary contribution setting over a relatively wide
range of dichotomous choice payments. Our results indicate that the cheap
talk script as used by C&T appears to eliminate hypothetical bias, but only
for higher payment levels.
2. Experimental Design
Our experimental design closely follows that of C&T and Brown et al.
(2003a, b) with three important differences: (1) we use a PPM whereas C&T
and Brown et al. employed a referendum, (2) each subject was asked to
respond to a randomly selected contribution level between $3 and $30,1 and
(3) we asked survey participants a series of follow-up questions that explored
the nature of their decision-making process and reaction to the cheap talk
script. In addition, our experiments were conducted in a computer lab,
whereas the C&T experiments were hand-run (we expect that this last dif-
ference should not affect the results significantly).
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate population at the
University of Massachusetts and randomly assigned to one of the three
treatments. There were multiple sessions for each treatment, and group size
varied between 4 and 17; subjects were not told the total number of
experiment participants. The good used in this study was a voluntary con-
tribution to the Massachusetts Chapter of the Nature Conservancy for the
specific purpose of placing signs in and around Mt. Toby (about 7 miles
from the university) to mark trails as well as rare and endangered species. To
mitigate incentives for free-riding, a $500 provision point was incorporated.
Participants were told that their money would be refunded if $500 were not
raised, and that benefits would be extended if the provision point were
exceeded. Participants were then asked a dichotomous choice willingness to
pay question with the amount asked varying randomly between 3 and 30
dollars2:
‘‘Are you willing to contribute $—— to the Nature Conservancy so that
signs can be placed in and around Mt. Toby identifying the trails and rare
species?’’
The computer replaced the blank in the above payment question with the
appropriate dollar amount and subjects were unaware of the amounts others
were asked to pay. Participants were also asked a series of demographic and
follow-up questions. The follow-up questions were designed to gather
information about each participant’s decision-making process. All questions
were presented sequentially, so respondents were unaware of the content of
the upcoming questions. Once a question was answered, respondents could
not return to a question. The survey, which was computerized, took
approximately 20 minutes to complete, after which the participants were paid
a $10 show-up fee.
The 3 2 experimental design is shown in Table I; each cell contains
the number of observations for each treatment. To test for possible ‘‘found
money’’ or ‘‘house money’’ effects, the CVM-only and Auction + CVM
treatments required different amounts of time and effort from participants.
Following C&T, the purpose of the auction was to get participants to
work so that they felt as though they earned the money they received for
participating in the experiments, and will therefore treat it as their own
money. In the auction stage, subjects participated in the buying and selling
of a fictitious commodity in which they could earn money in addition to
the $10 show-up payment. This auction for a fictitious good had no
relation with the good being valued or the CVM survey, but it provided
participants with an opportunity to earn slightly more money (average
auction earnings were about $1) for an additional 30 minutes in the lab.
The CVM-only participants only participated in the CVM computer
survey.
The remaining treatment variable in Table I describes the type of survey
environment participants experienced: real payment, hypothetical payment,
or hypothetical payment with cheap talk.3 We will refer to these treatments as
Real, Hypothetical and Cheap Talk, respectively. In each treatment, the good
was described in the same way and the provision rule was the same (the
instructions are in Appendix A). The only difference among treatments was
whether contributions would be real or hypothetical, and whether the cheap
talk script was read to the participants in a hypothetical payment setting (see
Appendix B for cheap talk script).
In the Hypothetical treatment, participants were told that they would not
have to pay any money, but that they should respond to the valuation
question as though they would have to pay today. Participants were asked
the same dichotomous choice voluntary contribution willingness to pay
question in the Real treatment but, at the end of the session, they were
required to actually pay the amount they indicated they would be willing to
contribute. For the Cheap Talk sessions, participants were given the same
survey as the participants in the Hypothetical treatment, except there was an
additional cheap talk script that was read to them by the experimenter before
the WTP question was posed. This cheap talk script was similar to that used
by C&T with minor wording changes to account for the provision point
mechanism instead of a referendum format.
In a homegrown value study, such as this, it is impossible to know an
individual’s true preferences. Therefore, consistent with similar experimental
valuation studies, wemake the assumption that payments in theReal treatment
accurately reflect the true economic value for the good. Recent work by List
et al. (2004) cast some doubt on the validity of this assumption. They find that
social isolation can have considerable influence on stated preferences, but that
the difference between real and hypothetical values is roughly constant across
treatments. This implies that although our response rates may be biased up-
wards, it should have no qualitative effects on our conclusions.
3. Results
The basic results from our experiments are presented in Table II. Despite a pre-
experiment survey that indicated strong support for Nature Conservancy
Table I. Experimental Design: Number of observations per treatment
Real Cheap talk Hypothetical
Auction + CVM 30 31 30
CVM-only 31 37 30
programs, in the Real treatment there were only 2 ‘‘yes’’ responses. The unex-
pected result that the good appears to have relatively little value provides us
with the opportunity to test cheap talk in a much simpler setting. In a typical
valuation survey, thepayment response canbedivided into twodecisions: (1)do
I value this goodat all? and (2) if so, howmuchamIwilling topay?This decision
sequence is sometimes estimated using a hurdle model. Opaluch and Segerson
(1989) note that for unfamiliar goods, individualsmay not knowprecisely their
WTP, but can place it within a range, or ambivalence region.Hence, should the
amount asked fall within this region, the person may become more uncertain
about her response. When payments are real, the respondent may invest more
cognitive effort to reduce the ambivalence region. This could lead to different
responses in real and hypothetical settings. The rationale behind the cheap talk
script is to coax individuals to invest this cognitive effort even though payment
is hypothetical. In our experiment, subjects typically earned $10–$12 for about
an hour of their time. For the higher payment amounts, above $9, a ‘‘yes’’
responsemeans that the subject would earn nothing and could possibly have to
contribute more than they earned. Given that real WTP approaches zero, for
these individuals, it is likely that these higher amounts asked lay outside the
ambivalence region. Therefore, the contribution decision in either the hypo-
thetical or the cheap talk setting shouldhavebeen straightforward– the amount
asked differs substantially from the good’s value, so respond ‘‘no’’.
However, this is not what we observe in Table II. Overall, the percentage
of participants giving a ‘‘yes’’ response to the dichotomous choice question in
the Hypothetical treatment (32%) was much greater than in the Real treat-
ment (3%). The cheap talk script appears to be effective only at the higher
Table II. Distribution of responses by amount asked and treatment
Amount asked Real Hypothetical Cheap talk
Yes No Yes No Yes No
$3 1 7 9 1 5 5
$6 1 10 2 7 5 5
$9 0 10 2 6 0 12
$12 0 12 2 7 0 14
$15 0 10 2 5 1 5
$18 0 7 2 8 0 12
$21 0 1 0 4 0 1
$24 0 1 0 1 0 0
$27 0 0 0 1 0 1
$30 0 1 0 1 0 2
payment levels. For $3 and $6 payments, however, cheap talk does not ap-
pear to have achieved its goal – half the Cheap Talk participants responded
‘‘yes’’ as opposed to only 11% in the Real treatment.
These findings, as expected, strongly suggest the presence of hypothetical
bias. Table III presents the results of two logit models in which the binary
contribution decision (1¼ ‘‘yes’’ response to contribution question) is a
function of the amount the subject was asked to pay, and dummy variables
for the Real and cheap Talk treatments. The expanded model also includes a
dummy variable for the Auction + CVM treatment along with social-eco-
nomic characteristics similar to those in C&T.
In both models, the coefficient for Real is negative and highly significant
confirming the presence of hypothetical bias. The next issue to be examined is
whether the C&T cheap talk script was effective in eliminating this hypo-
thetical bias. For both models, a test of the null hypothesis that Real¼Cheap
Talk is rejected at the 5% level of significance indicating that the probability
of contributing in the Cheap Talk treatment is different from that in the Real
treatment when the entire range of dollar amounts is considered. In addition,
Table III. Logit models for dichotomous choice valuation question
Variable Expanded modela
coefficient (Std. error)
Condensed modelb
coefficient (Std. error)
Intercept 275.5 (208.7) 1.66*** (0.57)
Amount Asked )0.25*** (0.06) )0.24*** (0.05)
Real )3.24*** (0.91) )3.06*** (0.81)
Cheap Talk )0.89 (0.71) )1.15** (0.49)
Participated in
Auction + CVM treatment
)0.20 (0.51)
Number of subjects in group )0.04 (0.08)
Year of Birth )0.14 (0.11)
Gender = 1 if female )0.30 (0.53)
Monthly Disposable Incomec 0.22 (0.30)
Dependent variable is whether the individual contributed the amount asked (0 = did not
contribute, 1 = did contribute).
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.
aN = 176; Likelihood ratio test: v2[8] = 52.00 (P = 0.00). A test of the null hypotheses
Real = Cheap talk is rejected at the 5% level of significance (v2[1] = 5.39, P = 0.03).
bN = 189; Likelihood ratio test: v2[3] = 50.70 (P = 0.00). A test of the null hypotheses
Real = Cheap talk is rejected at the 5% level of significance (v2[1] = 5.47, P = 0.02).
cCategorical variable (1 = $0–300; 2 = $301–400; 3 = $401–500; 4 = $501–600; 5 = $601–
800; 6 = $801–1000; 7 = $1001–2000; 8 = $2001–3000; 9 = $3001–4000; 10 = over
$4000).
since the coefficient on Cheap Talk in the expanded model is not statistically
significant, this model suggests that cheap talk had no effect on hypothetical
responses.
The five variables omitted in the condensed model were not jointly sig-
nificant in the expanded model (v2 ¼ 4.09, P-value ¼ 0.54). The rationale for
the condensed model is that since the amount asked varied across subjects, it
is possible that controlling for bid level, rather than the non-significant
socio-economic variables, is driving the equivalence between the Cheap Talk
and Hypothetical treatments in the expanded model. The primary results of
the condensed model are consistent with the expanded model: the coefficient
on Real is significant, and a test of the null hypothesis that Real = Cheap
Talk is rejected at the 5% level. However, the Cheap Talk coefficient is
significant, indicating that the script had some effect in reducing the bias, but
the reduction was not sufficient to bring hypothetical payment responses in
line with the real payment responses.
The model in Table III also includes a dummy variable for whether the
individual participated in the auction. This coefficient is not statistically
significant which suggests that either there were no found money effects, or
the found money effects were the same across both the Auction + CVM and
CVM only treatments. This is consistent with both Clark (2002) and List
(2004) who found no evidence of found money effects in public goods
experiments.
The logit results in Table III indicate that when taken over all payment
amounts, cheap talk reduced the percentage of subjects giving ‘‘yes’’ re-
sponses relative to subjects in the hypothetical situation without cheap talk,
but did not bring these responses in line with the real payment condition.
Using the approach in Brown et al. (2003a, b), Table IV presents the results
from a series of Fisher’s exact P-value tests to determine whether the
effectiveness of cheap talk is sensitive to the payment amount. These tests
make pairwise comparisons of the treatments while holding the payment
level constant. To ensure sufficient observations for a meaningful test, we
combined adjacent dollar amounts. When all dollar amounts are pooled,
the results in Table IV are consistent with the logit results – there is a
statistically significant difference between the real and cheap talk treat-
ments. However, this conclusion is sensitive to the amount asked. Cheap
talk appears to be ineffective for payments of $3 or $6, but is able to align
real and hypothetical responses with higher dollar amounts. Thus, it ap-
pears that Brown et al. (2003a, b) result is robust across both referenda and
PPM.4 It is worth noting that a recent meta analysis (Murphy et al.,
forthcoming) reports median real and hypothetical CV values in similar
experimental settings of $3.67 and $7.18, respectively. These values fall
within the range where the effectiveness of cheap talk may be limited in our
study.
The next issue to be addressed is why the cheap talk script was successful in
eliminating hypothetical bias for higher but not for lower payment levels.
Brown et al. suggest that some respondents may have believed they would not
vote against a referendum at low payment levels. ‘‘That is, they may not have
envisioned significant bias at that level, leaving them less susceptible to the
script.’’ However, interpreting our results is somewhat more complex because
there are well-known theoretical reasons why individuals may behave differ-
ently in a voluntary contribution as compared to a referendum valuation
format (Hoehn and Randall 1987). Taylor (1998) points out that if ‘‘the real-
payment experiment is not demand revealing, then differences in responses to
hypothetical and real valuation questions could be due to free-riding in the
real-payment scenario and not due to hypothetical bias in the hypothetical
survey.’’ In fact, C&T note that their evidence of hypothetical bias could
actually be due to free-riding since their referenda are not strictly closed.
Taylor (1998) did conduct a subsequent closed referenda for one of the goods
and reported results similar to those found in the C&T open referendum.
However, since the voluntary contribution mechanism used in our study is not
necessarily incentive compatible, it is important to determine whether results
of our real treatments were biased downward because of free-riding.
To test for free-riding behavior, we asked each subject a series of follow-
up questions. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1–10 the extent to
which the following statement influenced their decision about how much to
pay: ‘‘Since others will pay, I do not need to contribute as much.’’ Subjects
were also asked to indicate on a scale of 1–10 the degree to which they agreed
with the statement that ‘‘most other people will contribute less than what (the
good) is really worth to them because they will be able to enjoy the benefits,
regardless of how much they contribute.’’ We also asked whether the
respondent’s decision on how much to pay depended on what they thought
others would do, and whether they would change their payment decision if
they knew exactly what others had paid.
Table IV. Test of equal proportions by treatment and amount asked (Fisher’s exact p-value,
two-sided)
Null hypothesis Amount asked
All amounts $3 & 6 $6 & 9 $9 & 12 $12 & 15 $15 & 18 >$18
Real = Hypothetical 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.57
Real = Cheap Talk 0.02 0.01 0.19 a 0.48 1.00 a
Hypothetical ¼
Cheap Talk
0.06 0.75 1.00 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.48
‘a’ There were not any ‘‘yes’’ responses in either treatment so test cannot be conducted.
Table V summarizes the responses to these follow-up questions. Most
respondents were neutral with respect to the likelihood that others
would free-ride, and report that free-riding had very little influence on
their own payment decision; a very small percentage of respondents said
that their decision about how much to pay depended on what they
thought others would pay. These results suggest that there is very little evi-
dence of free-riding behavior in our experiments and are consistent with
the observations of Ethier et al. (2000) and Rondeau et al. (1999) that a
PPM can approximate actual demand in experimental settings. Even if free-
riding behavior exists in our subjects’ responses, the resulting free-rider
bias in our WTP estimates would likely be the same in all three treat-
ments and any differences in WTP should be due to the hypothetical
nature of the valuation question.5 Consequently, we believe that the
observed difference in responses to our Real, Hypothetical, and Cheap
Table V. Mean response to follow-up free-rider questionsa
Question Treatment
Real Cheap Talk Hypothetical
1. 1. ‘‘To what extent did the following
influence your decision about HOW
MUCH to contribute…Since others will
pay, I do no need to contribute as much.’’
(1 = less influence, 10 = more influence)
2.38 (2.04) 2.56 (2.05) 2.21 (1.62)
2. ‘‘What factors did you consider when
deciding how much to contribute TO-
DAY?… What I thought others would
do.’’ (0 = did not consider this factor,
1 = considered factor)
0.08 (0.28) 0.07 (0.26) 0.11 (0.32)
3. ‘‘Most other people will contribute less
than what (the good) is really worth to
them because they assume they will be able
to enjoy the benefits, regardless of how
much they contribute.’’ (1 = disagree,
10 = agree)
5.69 (3.04) 6.37 (2.67) 5.93 (2.53)
4. ‘‘If you knew exactly how much everyone
else contributed, would that change your
contribution decision?’’ (0 = no, 1 = yes)
0.20 (0.40) 0.30 (0.46) 0.18 (0.38)
a Standard deviation in parenthesis.
Talk treatments is primarily due to hypothetical bias and not free-
riding.6
However, we are unable to completely eliminate the possibility that free-
riding contributed to the hypothetical bias observed in this study. Moreover,
as noted by one reviewer, some respondents may have felt that voluntary
contributions are not a fair way to fund public goods. If concerns about
fairness have a greater affect on real than on hypothetical responses, then
hypothetical bias in a voluntary contribution setting may be related to both
free riding and concern about fairness. Since the C&T cheap talk script does
not attempt to address either of these issues, cheap talk may not be as
effective in a voluntary contribution setting relative to the traditional refer-
endum context.
On the other hand, subjects were also asked follow-up questions to
determine whether and how the cheap talk script may have influenced their
responses. When asked whether cheap talk influenced individual’s contri-
bution decisions, about 56% of respondents reported that they had reduced
their payment in response to cheap talk. However, about 44% stated that
they had already carefully considered their contribution decision and that
they were, therefore, not affected by the cheap talk script.
4. Conclusions
Although additional testing of the cheap talk approach is clearly needed, the
results reported here suggest that the effectiveness of this method, at least in
its present form, may be somewhat limited. It is likely that a number of
factors affect hypothetical bias and therefore no single technique will be the
‘‘magic bullet’’ that eliminates this bias. Ultimately, mitigating hypothetical
bias will probably involve a combination of techniques, including both
instrument and statistical calibration. We also recognize that practical con-
siderations, such as budget and time constraints, may limit the ability of some
CVM studies to implement more complex instruments (particularly if labo-
ratory experiments, such as those conducted by Fox et al. (1998), are nec-
essary for calibration). For CVM studies conducted with limited resources,
there may be an interest in ‘‘short cuts’’ that are ‘‘reasonably’’ effective.
Consistent with Brown et al. (2003a, b), our results suggest that cheap talk is
effective in a PPM, but only at higher payment levels. The cheap talk liter-
ature suggests that cheap talk’s effectiveness may be sensitive to script length,
subject experience with the good, and payment amounts. Therefore, further
research is necessary to develop a better understanding of underlying causes
of hypothetical bias and how it is affected by cheap talk. We conclude that
cheap talk may have the potential to achieve its objective, but the approach
should be used with caution.
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Notes
1. See Table II for bid distribution across treatments.
2. For some students, the amount asked exceeded the amount earned in the experiment. In the
instructions, we told students ‘‘If you choose to contribute more than you have earned
today, you will be expected to pay the difference in cash or check at the end of today’s
session’’ (with minor wording changes for the hypothetical treatments). In these cases, it is
possible that some contributions may have been constrained by the amount of money the
students had with them. However, we doubt this was an issue since no one responded ‘‘yes’’
to a real payment above $6.
3. In this article, we use the terms ‘‘real’’ and ‘‘actual’’ interchangeably. Contributions in the
real payment treatment may or may not be related to the actual Hicksian surplus measure
that CVM attempts to estimate.
4. Our combined $9 and $12 amounts are comparable to C&T’s $10 amount asked. In the
Hypothetical treatment, 24% of respondents responded ‘‘yes.’’ However, in both the Real
and Cheap Talk treatments, we observe zero ‘‘yes’’ responses which is consistent with
C&T’s cheap talk result.
5. For each question in Table V, we used a two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to make
pairwise comparisons of the distribution of responses across treatments. In all cases, the tests
failed to reject the hypothesis of equal distributions at any conventional level of significance.
6. It is also worth noting that many previous empirical studies find very little, if any, evidence
of free-riding behavior in actual CVM situations (Milon 1989).
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Appendix A – Instructions for Real Payment Treatment
The instructions for both the hypothetical payment and cheap talk treatments is the same, except
for minor wording changes to indicate that the payments are hypothetical. The text for the
hypothetical payment treatment is in <italics>.
The market experiment is now over.
Before you leave, we would like to ask you <a hypothetical question> about contributing to
the Massachusetts Chapter of the Nature Conservancy, which is a non-profit organization that
protects land in order to preserve plants, animals, and natural communities in Massachusetts.
<Even though earnings or payment of money in this upcoming part are hypothetical, we ask
that you respond to questions as if they involved a real cash payment.>
ALL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE <WOULD BE> VOLUNTARY.
If you <were to> choose to contribute more than you have earned today, you will <would> be
expected to pay the difference in cash or check at the end of today’s session.
If you <were to> choose not to contribute anything, your earnings from today are <would
be> yours to keep.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has one of the most diverse ranges of habitats among
all states in the U.S.
Massachusetts has the country’s sixth largest state park system and the country’s largest
concentration of land trusts operate here. The activities of the Nature Conservancy in Mas-
sachusetts help to preserve these areas through acquisition of land so that these lands may be
kept in their natural state for years to come.
The Massachusetts Chapter of the Nature Conservancy has preserved 14,000 acres, many
harboring rare species of plants and animals.
The Conservancy bases its land protection action on scientific studies and surveys. These
studies identify the rarest plants, animals and natural communities that are at risk.
In Massachusetts these types of areas have included parts of the Connecticut River Valley,
Martha’s Vineyard, and the Southern Berkshires. By protecting these areas, threatened and
endangered species such as cooper’s hawks, box turtles, spring salamanders, and the yellow
lady’s slipper are provided safe habitat in which they may continue to live.
The Conservancy protects these types of natural areas by outright acquisition of the land,
by Conservation easement, and through registry programs that allow private landowners to
preserve their properties under the guidance of the Conservancy.
Locally, the Nature Conservancy is currently purchasing land near the Mt. Toby State
Forest, which is about 10 minutes from campus.
The mixed oak–hemlock–sugar–maple forest of Mt. Toby and its wetlands are home to
rare salamanders, turtles, and many wildflowers, both rare and common, including the au-
tumn coralroot and the trout lily. Mt. Toby is also a refuge for wildlife such as ravens and wild
turkeys.
The area provides many types of outdoor activities including hiking, bird-watching, and cross-
country skiing. However trails and rare species are often not well marked, which can reduce
the enjoyment people get from visiting the park.
The Nature Conservancy needs donations to support its program to prevent development on
Mt. Toby and to mark trails so these lands may be preserved in their natural state for the use
and enjoyment of the public today and in the future.
Several groups of people are being asked to contribute to this program. If a total of $500
dollars is raised, we will be able to place signs in and around Mt. Toby identifying the trails
and rare species.
However, if not enough money is raised to fund this program, everyone’s contribution will be
refunded. If more than enough is raised, additional contributions can be provided to the
program.
<Suppose that we were to ask for actual cash payments today.
You would then be asked to check ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on whether or not you would contribute to the
Nature Conservancy.>
If enough money is <were> raised, the money will <would> be sent to the Nature Conser-
vancy and the receipt will be posted on the bulletin board outside of Stockbridge Hall Room
220.
<Although payment will be hypothetical, we ask that you respond as if this involved a real cash
payment.>
In a moment, you will be asked <a hypothetical question about> whether you wish to con-
tribute to Nature Conservancy here and now.
These voluntary contributions will <would> be deducted from your earnings today. If you
<were to> choose to contribute more than you earned, you will <would> be expected to pay
the difference in full at the end of today’s session.
Before you continue, if you have any questions raise your hand and someone will come to
you.
Appendix B – Cheap Talk Script
Participants were given a printed copy of this script and were asked to read along as the
experimenter read the script aloud.
Before you make a decision about this, please open the stapled sheet of paper in your par-
ticipant’s packet. Please read along as I read the contents to you.
Before you make your decision, I want to talk to you about a problem that we have in
studies like this one. As I told you a minute ago, this is a hypothetical decision, not a real
one. No one will actually pay money at the end of the decision. But I also asked you to
respond to the decision as though the result of your vote would involve a real cash payment
by you.
And that’s the problem.
In most studies of this kind, folks seem to have a hard time doing this. They act differently
in a hypothetical situation, where they don’t really have to pay money, than they do in a real
situation, where they really could have to pay money. For example, in a recent study, several
different groups of people made decisions just like this one you are about to make. Payment
was hypothetical for these groups, as it will be for you. No one had to pay money in this
hypothetical situation. The results of these studies were that on average, across the groups,
38% of them decided to contribute. With another set of groups with similar people deciding
on the same situation as you will decide on here, but where the payment was real and people
really did have to pay money if they said yes, the results on average, across the groups were
that 25% decided to contribute. That’s quite a difference isn’t it?
We call this a ‘hypothetical bias.’ ‘Hypothetical bias’ is the difference that we continually
see in the way people respond to hypothetical situation as compared to real situations, people
seem to respond just like you see here on the overhead.
In the real situation, where people knew they would have to pay money if they decided to
contribute, 25% said ‘yes’ and 75% said ‘no.’ When payment was hypothetical and people
knew they would not pay anything if they decided to contribute, just like your decision today,
38% said ‘yes’ and 62% said ‘no.’
How can we get people to think about their decision in a hypothetical situation like they
think in a real situation? How do we get them to think about what it means to really dig into
their pocket and pay money, if in fact they really are not going to have to do it?
Let me tell you why I think that we continually see this hypothetical bias, why people
behave differently in a hypothetical situation than they do when the situation is real. I think
that when we hear about a situation that involves doing something that is basically good, for
example helping people in need, improving environmental quality, or anything else, our basic
reaction in a hypothetical situation is to think: sure, I would do this. I really would spend the
money; I really, really, think I would. What our ‘‘yes’’ vote really means in this case, is that we
are basically good people, and that we would like to see good things happen.
But when the situation is real, and we would actually have to spend our money, we think
a different way. We basically still would like to see good things happen, but when we are
faced with the possibility of having to spend money, we think about our options: If I spend
money on this, that’s money I don’t have to spend on other things. If I spend money to help
conserve natural areas in Massachusetts, that’s money I don’t have to spend on groceries, go
to a movie, or perhaps to give to some other environmental organization. So, when the
payment is real, we act in a way that takes into account the limited amount of money we
have. We decide realizing that we just don’t have enough money to do everything we might
like to do. This is just my opinion, of course, but it’s what I think may be going on in the
hypothetical situation.
In any case, the only way that we know to get people like you to decide in our hypothetical
situation just like you would if the situation was real is to simply ask you: In the decision that
we’re going to take in a few minutes please do the following:
Think about what you are deciding on. If this were real, if you said yes, you would actually
have to dig into your pocket and pay $—— right now, do you really want to fund the
conservation of natural lands in the state of Massachusetts enough that you would be willing
to spend the money?
If I were in your shoes, and I was asked to decide ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on this proposition that
requires me to spend $——, I would think about how I feel about spending my money this way.
When I got ready to decide, I would ask myself: if this was a real situation, and I had to pay
$——, do I really want to spend my money this way. If I really did, I would say yes; if I didn’t, I
would say no. I wouln’t throw my money around. That’s just my opinion, of course. You must
do whatever you want to do.
In any case, I ask you to decide exactly as you would if you were really going to face the
consequences of your decision: which is to pay money if you say yes to contribute.
Please keep this in mind when deciding whether you would contribute to this program.
If you have any questions raise your hand and someone will come to you.
